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THE SUCCESS OF THE COMPANY IN S. 172(1) OF 
THE UK COMPANIES ACT 2006: TOWARDS AN 
‘ENLIGTHENED DIRECTORS’PRIMACY’  ?
LUCA CERIONI (*)
This  paper  argues  that  S.  172(1)  of  the  UK Companies  Act  2006,  which,  by  
incorporating the concept of enlightened shareholders value, requires a director  
of a company to have regard to several non-shareholders groups,  can be read 
from a particular managerial perspective, and that directors could end up having  
a personal interest ‘to internalise’ exactly this perspective in their approach to S.  
172(1). The article submits that, when this occurs, this managerial perspective  
can  offer  an  input  to  the  legal  reasoning  and  to  the  model  of  companies 
underpinning UK company law, by turning the enlightened shareholders value  
into an approach that may be defined ‘enlightened directors’ primacy’ and that  
would benefit  the long-term survival and development of  the business activity.  
This  outcome would be fully  in  line with  the OECD Principles on Corporate  
Governance,  and  with  the  ‘interest  of  the  company’  as  identified  in  some 
continental Europe jurisdictions.  
INTRODUCTION
      A fair body of literature has already been dealing with s. 172(1) of the UK 
Companies  Act  2006,  which incorporates  the  ‘enlightened shareholders  value’ 
approach to corporate governance in the UK. The various contributions appear to 
have mainly dealt with the issues regarding the effectiveness of this provision and 
its enforcement: e.g., whether shareholders value could still be enlightened after 
the withdrawn of the would-be requirement on listed companies to produce an 
operating and financial review (OFR)1; whether s. 172(1) may really determine a 
change  in  corporate  behaviour,  in  particular  whether  the  non-shareholder 
constituencies listed in the provision would find any remedy in the event  that 
directors  have  no  regard  to  their  interests,  issue  which  has  attracted  a  firmly 
negative  response2;  in  what  way  the  advice  of  legal  practitioners  may  affect 
directors’ and shareholders’ response to this new provision 3.  
However, directors’ general duty of promoting ‘the success of the company’ and 
the fact that, according to s. 172(1), ‘in doing so’ directors need to have regard to 
the non-exhaustive  list  of  factors  indicated  in  that  provision,  give  rise  to  two 
questions, which are consequent to each others: 1) could s. 172(1) be regarded, 
from a managerial perspective, as an indication about the concept of ‘success’, 
1(*) Lecturer in Commercial Law at Brunel University (Uxbridge, West London), Law School; 
LLM. Ph.D in Law; e-mail: luca.cerioni@brunel.ac.uk (institutional) or lcerio@yahoo.it (private). 
I’m thankful to my former Ph.D. supervisor, Prof. Janet Dine at the Centre for Commercial Law 
Studies (CCLS), Queen Mary, University of London, for her useful comments on this piece.
 Andrew .Johnston, ‘After the OFR: Can UK Shareholder Value Still be Enlightened ?’ (2006) 7 
European Business Organisation Law Review  817.   
2 Demetra Arsalidou, ‘Shareholder primacy in cl. 173 of the Company Law Bill 2006’ (2007) 28 
Company  Lawyer 67,  submits  that,  in  this  case,  the  position  of  stakeholders  in  general,  and 
employees in particular, would be even worse than under s. 309 of Companies Act 2006. 
3 Joan Loughery, Andrew Keay and Luca Cerioni, ‘Legal Practitioners, The Corporate Objective 
and The Shaping of Corporate Governance’, forthcoming in (2008) 1 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies. 
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and, 2) if so, could  this perspective offer an original  ‘input’ to the legal reasoning 
and to the model of companies underpinning UK company law ?     
     This work attempts at offering a response to both questions. For this purpose, 
in part 1 it argues that each of the factors listed in s. 172(1) can be examined from 
a strategic managerial perspective, and that, from this perspective, all these factor 
taken together suggest a concept of ‘success of the company’. Subsequently, in 
part 2, the paper aims at demonstrating that it would be in the interest of directors, 
despite the short-term approach that seemed to prevail in recent years, to adopt 
this strategic managerial perspective as the most ‘strategic consultancy’ that they 
could draw from s. 172(1), in order for them to become  more invulnerable to the 
risk of liability for breach of duty than they would otherwise be. Subsequently, 
part 3 submits that this ‘consultancy’, if accepted by directors, has the potential 
not only to allow them to be the only agents controlling the companies, but also to 
offer a perhaps unforeseen input to the legal reasoning and to the development of 
the model of companies underpinning UK company law. Part 4 mainly argues that 
such development – for which the definition of ‘enlightened directors’ primacy’ is 
proposed -  would, ultimately, deprive of any practical meaning, at least for some 
companies, the classic distinction between the shareholder-centred model and the 
stakeholders model. Ultimately, this contribution is, therefore, aimed at offering 
an additional perspective to the discussions that are probably bound to continue, 
on s.  172(1),  for  some years after  the entry into force of  this  provision on 1 
October 2007.
      
I. A MANAGERIAL VIEW ON S. 172(1)
A.  A Strategic Managerial Perspective as a Framework for Analysis and a 
Consequent Key Question
     Despite the absence in s. 172 (1) of an indication about the meaning of the 
expression ‘success of the company’, it was stated that ‘success means what the 
members collectively want the company to achieve. For a commercial company, 
success will usually mean long-term increase in value’4.   It was also indicated, 
during the reform process, that this expression ties all elements currently listed by 
s. 172(1) together5.   Given the perception by a significant number of directors 
that they had to give priority to the immediate returns of shareholders irrespective 
of  longer  term  returns,  the  Company  Law  Review  Steering  Group  (CLRSG) 
believed that it was necessary to encourage a change in directors’ behaviour. For 
this purpose, it  believed that a new formulation intended to clarify the law on 
directors’ duties and make it more accessible could bring about this behavioural 
change6. This would occur by recognising that the ultimate objective of benefiting 
the shareholders ‘is  achieved by building a  successful  business,  which in turn 
depends on the adoption of an appropriate timescale and paying proper attention 
to  relationships,  impacts  and  reputation’7.   This  perceived  importance  of 
4  Definition by Lord Goldsmith, Lords Grand Committee, 6 February 2006, column 255, quoted 
in the recently published guidance Companies Act 2006, Duties of company directors, Ministerial 
Statements, DTI June 2007, at p. 7 (hereinafter: Ministerial Statements).
5 John Parkinson, ‘Inclusive Company Law’ in J. de Lacy (ed),  The Reform of United Kingdom 
Company Law (2002), 54. 
6  See Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the  
Framework (2000), 31, 36 and 37; on the diffuse ‘short-terminist’ approach by directors, Institute 
of Directors Good Boardroom Practice (1999). 
7 Parkinson above n 5,  54.
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relationships,  impact  and  reputation  is  consistent  with  the  recommendations 
formulated by the 1998 Hampel Report, according to which directors can meet 
their  legal  duties  to  shareholders,  and  can  pursue  the  objective  of  long-term 
shareholder  value  successfully,  only  by  developing  and sustaining  stakeholder 
relationships8. 
      The reasons for the importance of relationships, impacts and reputation in 
building the success of the business can be suggested by a strategic managerial 
perspective,  which  latter  can  also  clarify  the  notion  itself  of  ‘success  of  the 
company’ as a long-term increase in value that cannot be found in s. 172(1). This 
strategic managerial perspective would be, basically, concerned with the question 
how to get the most out of the firm’s assets9 and would regard,  as assets,  all 
factors listed in s. 172(1) simply because all of them contribute, either directly or 
indirectly, to the very existence of the business activity.     
    The  immediate  and  obvious  observation  from  the  strategic  management 
perspective is that, if the promotion of the long-term health of the company were 
sacrificed to the maximisation of share prices, there would risk to be no longer the 
company whose shares must (under that view) have their price maximised. The 
negative effects caused by the pressure on the maximisation of share prices, if this  
maximisation is pursued as a goal on its own,  have already been highlighted by 
the literature as part of the history of the corporate collapses which marked the 
start  of  the  new century10.  Unsurprisingly,  the  OECD Principles  of  Corporate 
Governance11, which are non-binding recommendations addressed to all member 
countries and intended to offer a point of reference for lawmakers, refers to the 
long-term success of the corporation12.  This suggests that the increase in share 
price, which, by its nature as a price movement, is visible to a greater extent the 
shorter the period of time in which it is observed, cannot be the objective, but can 
only be significant, over time, as one of the signals of the company’s long-term 
increase in values, together with other signals such as the business’ growing share 
in the market, volume of sales etc..
    The CLRSC, while choosing the shareholders primacy approach, realised the 
importance of building long-term relationships13 and allowed directors to take into 
considerations constituencies other than shareholders, but  only to the extent that 
the protection  of  the  interests  of  these  constituencies  promotes  the  interest  of 
shareholders14. However,  it was said that leading businesses already regard the 
factors that are now listed in s. 172(1) as elements to be taken into account in 
promoting the long-term, sustainable success of the company, i.e. as elements to 
8  Christine Mallin, Corporate Governance (2004),  22.
9 Garth Saloner, Andrea Shepard, Joel Podolny, Strategic Management (2001), 1
10 E.g.,  Margaret  Blair,  ‘Post-Enron  Reflections  on  Comparative  Corporate  Governance’, 
Georgetown University  Law Center,  2002  Working Paper Series  in  Business,  Economics  and 
Regulatory Law, Working Paper No. 316663;  Janet Dine, ‘Using companies to oppress the poor’ 
in  Janet Dine, Andrew Fagan (ed) Human Rights and Capitalism (2006), 66.
11 First issued in 1999 and subsequently published in a revised version in 2004, after the corporate 
collapses (hereinafter: OECD Principles ).
12 OECD Principles (2004), 12. 
13 Company Law Review,  Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the 
Framework (2000) para. 2.22.
14 See Paul Davies, ‘Enlightened Shareholder Value and the New Responsibilities of Directors’, 
Lecture given at the University of Melbourne Law School (the inaugural WE Hearn Lecture), 4 
October 2005, 5.  
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be considered in running the corporation according to ‘current best practice’15.  If 
this view is accepted, the conception whereby the interests of other constituencies 
are to be considered only to the extent that the protection of the interests of these 
constituencies  promotes  the  interest  of  shareholders  gives  rise  to  this  key 
question:   can there be a  general criteria  to ascertain the extent to which the 
protection of these other interests does not promote the interest of shareholder ?   
A   managerial strategy of getting the most out of each factor contributing to the 
existence of the business activity16 could suggest, as regards each of the elements 
that  are  listed by s.  172(1),  the assessment that follows, and could lead to an 
overall response to the question. 
B. A Strategic Managerial Assessment on Each Factor listed in s. 172(1)
S. 172(1) lists, as non-exhaustive elements to which directors should have regard: 
the  likely  consequence  of  any  decision  in  the  long-term;  the  interests  of  the 
company’s employees; the need to foster  the company’s business relationships 
with suppliers, customers and others; the impact of the company’s operations on 
the community and the environment; the desirability of the company maintaining 
a  reputation  for  high  standards  of  business  conduct;  the  need  to  act  fairly  as 
between shareholders. The reasons for the importance of these elements, and a 
strategy of getting the most out of each of them, could be explained as follows.
1 The Likely Consequence of any Decision  in the Long Term
     It  was  properly  emphasized  that  shares  are,  in  essence,  ‘rights  to  future 
incomes’17, so that, without the continuation in the future of the dividends flows 
that  shares  can  allow  their  owners  to  get,  there  would  be  no  benefit  for 
shareholders.  In  turn,  to  preserve  the  company’s  capacity  to  continue  in  its 
business  over  time,  and  thus  to  generate  future  dividends flows,  any decision 
going beyond routine day-to-day operations – or, in other words, any  strategic 
decision  -  must  necessarily  consider,  by  using  the  available  information,   the 
consequences  in  the  long-run  of  the  intended  course  of  action.  These 
consequences  need  to  be  considered  in  economic  terms,  i.e.,  on  the  business’ 
ability to generate profits according to accountancy measures; in financial terms, 
i.e., on  these profits’ ability to generate timely inflows of financial resources; in 
broader social terms, i.e. in terms of reactions and responses by all those groups, 
commonly named as ‘stakeholders’, upon whom the company’s ability to carry on 
business (and to get economic and financial returns) ultimately depends.  Leading 
management literature has come to the conclusion that  ‘The corporation’s most 
important asset – and the only one that it cannot create or replace on its own – is 
its  acceptance  within  society  as  a  legitimate  institution’18 ,  where  acceptance 
implicitly  means  continuous  acceptance  over  time,  without  which  the 
shareholders’  rights  to future income are  put  at  risk.  It  follows that,  from the 
strategic managerial viewpoint, the first element listed by s. 172(1) can be taken 
to mean:  ‘the likely consequences of any decision on the continuous acceptance, 
15 Alistair Darling, ‘Reforms in pursuit of enlightened shareholders value’, Financial Times, 4 June 
2006.
16 And thus of considering, as noted above, the factors listed in s. 172(1) as part of the company’s 
assets.
17 Paddy  Ireland,  ‘Property  and  contract  in  contemporary  corporate  theory’  (2003)  23  Legal 
Studies  453,  493.
18 Jim  Post,  Lisa  Preston  and  Sybille  Sachs,  Redefining  The  Corporation,  Stakeholders  
Management and Organizational Wealth (2002), 256. 
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over time, of the company’s activity within society’; accordingly, a strategic view 
would conclude that consideration of this element is always necessary.    
2  The Interests of  the Company’s  Employees  
     It was pointed out that the new formulation ‘can be said to express the insight 
that the shareholders are not likely to do well out of a company whose workforce 
is  constantly  on  strike,  whose  customers  don’t  like  its  products  and  whose 
suppliers would rather deal with its competitors’19. As regards employees, they 
can of course be expected to be dissatisfied when they perceive that their interests 
are being disregarded,  and their  dissatisfaction is inevitably bound to generate 
unfavourable employees relations and to affect negatively all the organisation due 
to the interdependences between their work and the final output delivered by the 
company.  It  has  been  recognised  that  ‘Management  of  interdependences 
constitutes  a  major  activity  of  everyday  work  life’20 and  that  ‘Favourable 
employee relations help reduce turnover and encourage long-term and cooperative 
commitment to the organisation’21.   Because business runs better  when people 
within a company have close ties and trust one another, but building such positive 
interdependencies, which have been defined as ‘social capital’, is difficult in the 
current volatile times22, it has been argued that this social capital is even more 
important and, by investing in it, companies will seize the opportunities in today’s 
volatile,  virtual  business  environment23.  For  this  reason,  manager  can  foster 
cooperation  by  giving  employees  a  common  sense  of  purpose  through  good 
strategic  communication  and  inspirational  leadership24.  In  turn,  this  sense  of 
purpose is bound to induce employees to see the company not merely as a source 
of income but also and mainly as the  right  organisation within which they can 
accomplish themselves from the professional viewpoint, i.e. as the organisation to 
which, thus, they can commit themselves by enhancing it through personal skills 
development, teamwork and constructive suggestions. In turn, finding the  right  
company in which personal  aspirations can be realised,  and thus the company 
with  whom a  long-term relationship  can  be  possible,  is  certainly  the  primary 
interest of each employee25. The resulting personal commitment of employees and 
their  voluntary  ‘willingness  to  walk  the  extra  mile’26 would  be  the  strategic 
‘reward’ that the company would get from considering the employees not merely 
as labour suppliers but as individuals  with whom a common sense of purpose 
needs to be built  up. It  can thus be argued that,  from a strategic management 
perspective, the requirement of s. 172(1) to have regard to ‘the interests of the 
company’  employees’  can  be  interpreted  as  if  it  red:  ‘the  interests  of  the 
19 Davies above n 14, 5-6.
20 Sze-Sze Wong, Gerardine De Sanctis, Nancy Staudenmayer, ‘The Relationship Between Task 
Interdependency  and  Role  Stress:  A  Revisit  of  the  Job  Demands-Control  Model’  (2007)  44 
Journal of Management  Studies 284. 
21 Post, Preston,  Sachs above n 18, 48 
22 Laurence Prusak, Don Cohen ‘How to Invest in Social Capital’ (2001) 79  Harvard Business 
Review 86, 87. 
23 Ibid, 93, where the Authors conclude that ‘In our organisation, just as in our neighborhoods and 
nations, our ability to recapture community will determine our progress’
24 Ibid, 92.
25 Stephen Walmsley, ‘Leadership with a human face’ (2004) 77 CMA Management 8, 14, notes 
that today’s employees are ‘more concerned about having leaders they can identify with. The want 
to know how and what they are contributing to within an organisation. Above all, they demand to 
be engaged and see the big picture..’. 
26  Post, Preston, Sachs above n 18,  48
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company’s employees to consider the company as the right organisation which 
allows their aspirations to be realised, and with whom a mutually beneficial and 
thus long-term relationship can be built’.  Arguably, the promotion of this interest 
is one of the preconditions for the promotion of shareholders’ interest to benefit 
from their rights to future incomes.  
3 The  Need  to  foster  the  Company’s  Business  Relationships  with  Suppliers,  
Customers and Others
If  a  business  had  only  occasional,  short-terms  relationships  with  suppliers, 
customers and others such as financers, the profit, however high, made by that 
business would signal nothing, ex ante, about the business’ ability to continue to 
generate  profits  in  future  accounting  years.  This  because  the  profit  would  be 
calculated ex post, at the end of each accounting year, and the short-term nature of 
the relationships which have made that profit possible in a specific accounting 
year would imply a total uncertainty as to whether those relationships will or will 
not arise again in the future. In turn, this uncertainty would minimise what the 
management  literature  considers  to  be  the  ‘relational  assets’  available  to  the 
company,  i.e., it would minimise the benefits created by stakeholder linkages, 
collaborations, processes and reputation-increasing factors27. The relational assets 
are nevertheless considered to be a key component of the ‘organisational wealth’ 
of the company,  which is the capacity of the company to create value over the 
long-term28 and which needs to rely, inter alia, on  stable  customer and supplier 
relations29. The literature on relationship marketing stressed that customer loyalty 
to brand and firms reduces marketing costs, and stabilises production and sales 
volume30 . It was argued that, in the current global scenario, ‘as close and stable 
stakeholder relationships become rarer, they also become more valuable’31. This 
certainly applies to stable relationships with suppliers and customers, because the 
reduced marketing costs, together with the possibility of favourable terms granted 
by suppliers who trust the company and with the stabilisation of production and 
sales, would generate a twofold benefit. On the one hand, it would result in an 
increase of  the operating profit  which would be shown by the profit  and loss 
account of the company, i.e.,  in an increase of the most important part  of the 
overall profit. This because the stabilisation of sales would enhance the capacity 
to stabilise the revenues from sales, at the same time as at least one component of 
the expenses which are necessary to produce these revenues (such as marketing 
costs) would decrease. On the other hand, the stabilisation would also make it 
possible to reasonably foresee the amount of the operating profit that the business 
could reap in the future. 
It would thus be possible to argue that the strategic managerial perspective would 
read  ‘the  need  to  foster  company’s  business  relationships  with  suppliers, 
customers  and  others’  as  meaning:  ‘the  need  to  create  stable  business 
27 Post, Preston, Sachs above  n 18, 45
28 Ibid, 45-9, where the Authors accept the concept of ‘organisational wealth’ elaborated by  Karl 
Erik Sveiby, The New Organisational Wealth: Managing and Measuring Knowledge-Based Assets 
(1997).
29 Ibid, 254.
30 Frederik E. Webster, ‘The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation’ (1992) 56 Journal of  
Management 4,  1-17 . 
31 Post, Preston, Sachs above n 18,  254
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relationships with suppliers, customers and others in order to maximise,  ex ante, 
the  company’s possibility to continue to generate its operating profit over time’. 
4  The  Impact  of  the  Company’s  Operations  on  The  Community  and  the  
Environment
The wealth-enhancing advantages of good relations with local communities and 
citizens have been stressed by the strategic management literature, according to 
which the ‘social license to operate’ implies that the business activity enjoys the 
support,  or  at  least  does  not  attract  the  hostility,  of  members  of  the  general 
public32.  It  has  been  noted  that  ‘A  firm  that  enjoys  favourable  community 
relationships  can  be  a  regular  participant  in  local  community  planning  and 
problem solving, and can have a chance to present its own side of the story when 
problems or opportunities arise’33. In effect, the existence of a business activity 
whose  operations  have  adverse  consequences  on  the  community  and  on  the 
environment, and who attract the hostility of the public, is under continuous threat 
even  if  this  activity  generates  profits  for  some  time,  because  the  negative 
reputation  tends  to  spread  from  one  stakeholders  group  to  another34 and, 
ultimately, creates a fertile ground for competitors.      
   This realisation offers a reply to the view whereby saying that shareholders and 
other  interests  overlap  is  not  the  same  thing  as  saying  that  they  necessarily 
coincide, and that maximising long-term profits and acting in an ethically, socially 
or environmentally responsible way are not always consistent35 .  This view cites, 
as examples,  occasions where it  will  be clear  to  management  that  serving the 
interests of shareholders, even when their interests are viewed as long-term ones, 
requires discontinuing an activity and dismissing part of the workforce, and the 
fact that not all forms of socially undesirable behaviour will result in a reputation-
related damage that inflicts costs on the company that exceed the gains deriving 
from the questionable acts36.
  These  observations  appear  to  conceptualise  the  interests  of  shareholders  as 
satisfied  when  they  are  supposed  to  win  the  most  in  a  zero-sum  game. 
Nonetheless, the objection37 would be that, to the extent that this approach implies 
sacrificing relationships or  compromising the company’s ability  to  broaden its 
stakeholders base, it  risks threatening the most solid foundation for a business 
activity to prosper in the current international and volatile business environment: a 
stable, and possibly increasing, base of long-term relationships38. The fact that this 
is the most solid base for businesses to prosper is, implicitly, recognised even by 
the OECD Principles,  which highlight  the  importance of  a  ‘wealth  –  creating 
cooperation’ amongst stakeholders, and state that corporations should recognise 
that the contribution of stakeholders (which contribution would not really be such 
without long-term relationships) constitute a valuable resource for the long-term 
success39. From this perspective, in the examples above indicated, the dismissed 
workforce or those who are damaged by socially undesirable behaviour, who can 
32 Ibid, 49-50
33 Ibid, 50.  
34 Ibid, p. 46.
35 Parkinson above n 5,  49.
36 Ibid.
37 Apart from the (in) opportunity in itself of creating perceptions of zero-sum games: see infra, 
under  C. 
38 Blair above n 10, 6;  and Post, Preston, Sachs above n 18, 254.
39 OECD Principles, Annotations, p. 46.
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be expected to be hostile to the company and to contribute to the spread of a 
negative reputation, deprive the company of part of the resources who are needed 
for its long-term success.
Arguably, the ‘the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment’ can thus be read,  from the strategic management perspective,  as 
meaning  ‘the  impact  of  the  company’s  operation  on  the  general  community’s 
willingness  to  continue  to  provide  the  company  with  resources  which  are 
important for its long-term success’.   
5   The Desirability of the Company Maintaining a Reputation for High Standards 
of Business Conduct
A growing body of literature has been indicating a business case for “Corporate 
Social  Responsibility”  (CSR)40,  which  is  being  defined  in  several  ways41 but 
consists, basically, in a business conduct of high (ethical) standards such as to 
internalise,  in  the  company’s  decisions–making,  social  and  environmental 
concerns beyond minimum legal standards. It was noted that CSR ‘can be viewed 
as a form of reputation building or maintenance’42 The company’s reputation for 
high standards of business conduct is desirable because ‘high ethical standards are 
in the long term interests of the company as a means to make it  credible and 
trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term 
commitments’43.  This reputation is obviously interconnected with the impact of 
the  company’s  operations  on  the  community  and  on  the  environment  as 
considered under point 4), as it can be described as a  reputation for a positive  
impact of company’s operation on the community and on the environment. 
The  strategic  managerial  perspective  would  thus  read  the  ‘desirability  of  the 
company maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct’  as ‘the 
desirability of the company maintaining  a reputation for positive effects of its 
operations  on  the  general  community  and  on  the  environment,  and  thus  a 
reputation such as to make it  credible and trustworthy’. 
  6   The Need to Act Fairly Between the Members of The Company
If those shareholders who are in a weaker position than others and who have not 
taken part in the appointment of directors feel that directors, in their choices, tend 
to  disadvantage  them  (for  the  benefit  of  stronger  shareholders),   these 
shareholders cannot be expected to commit  their investment in the capital of the 
40 Inter  alia:  T.Donaldson,  L.Preston,  ‘The  stakeholder  theory  of  the  corporation:  concepts, 
evidence, and implications’,  (1995) 20 Academy of Management Review  986; Jill Solomon and 
Aris Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (2004), 14, 28 and 191-2.
41 E.g., the UK Government states that CSR ‘.is about how business takes account of its economic, 
social and environmental impacts in the way it operates – maximising the benefits and minimising 
the downsides’ (www.csr.gov.uk) and ‘..about companies acting voluntarily to raise performance 
beyond minimum legal  standards’;  the  World  Business  Council  for  Sustainable  Development 
(WBCSD) has defined CSR as, ‘the continuing commitment by businesses to behave ethically and 
contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families as well as of the local community and society at large’:   see WBCSD Report ‘Meeting 
Expectations. Corporate Social Responsibility’, p. 3, available at  www.wbcsd.ch, links ‘business 
role’ and ‘corporate responsibility’.  
42 Abagail McWilliams, Donald S.Siegel and Patrick M.Wright ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: 
Strategic Implications’  (2006) 43 Journal of Management Studies 1,  4.
43 OECD Principles, Annotations, p. 60
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company  with  a  long-term  perspective.  Nonetheless,  it  was  noted  that  the 
willingness of investors to hold securities of a company determines the ease with 
which,  and lowers the cost  at  which, additional capital  can be raised,  so that 
investors who are willing to hold securities over the long term, without regard to 
temporary  fluctuations  in  dividends  or  values,  are  of  key  importance  for  the 
‘organisational  wealth’  of  the  company44.  This  because  the  presence  of  these 
investors, who are often referred to as ‘patient capital’,  contributes on the one 
hand to stabilise corporate financial structures, and, on the other hand, to give 
employees and other stakeholders some assurance that their own commitments to 
the  business  activity  will  not  be  sacrificed  for  short  term  financial  returns45. 
Consequently,  when there are  shareholders who perceive directors’  choices  as 
detrimental to them to the advantage of other shareholders, the ‘patient capital’ 
available to the business activity inevitably risks to decrease, with the negative 
side effects on the business’ ability of generating profits over time.     
     The strategic managerial perspective thus suggests to read the last element 
listed in s. 172(1) as ‘the need to act fairly between the members of the company, 
in  order  to  maintain  (and,  possibly,  to  increase)  the  patient  capital  that  the 
business activity needs’. 
C  The Response to the Key Question
          If the indications offered by a strategic managerial perspective regarding 
each element listed in s. 172(1) are read all together, it is possible to infer that 
they are complementary to each others, and to identify only one general criteria  
to ascertain the extent to which the protection of other interests does not promote 
the interest  of  shareholder:  the  protection of  other  interests  would  not  benefit 
shareholders’ interest when it would conflict with the survival and development of  
the business activity over time. The implication of this criteria are not negligible. 
       It was noted that the difference between the inclusive approach which was 
adopted under the label of  ‘enlightened shareholders value’ and the ‘pluralist’ or 
‘stakeholders’  model  which  was  rejected  by  the  CLRSG lies  in  what  should 
happen  in  those  occasions  when  there  is  a  clash  of  interests  between  the 
shareholders and other affected groups:  the inclusive approach would encourage 
companies  to  adopt  the  necessary  long term perspective  to  recognise  that  co-
operative relationships are important in building competitive strengths, but would 
not require company’s management to be inclusive when there is no economic 
case for it, so that, when it considers interests as contrasting, this approach would 
attribute  priority  to  shareholders’  interests;  by  contrast,  the  pluralist  approach 
would, in these cases, require a balancing of interests46.  
     Nevertheless,   the  strategic  perspective  above  indicated  would  call  into 
discussion  exactly  the  view  that  there  may  be  situations  when  there  is  no 
economic case for inclusiveness. This view appears to be rooted in a context in 
which,  in  assessing  their  own  interests,  the  various  groups  only  regard  these 
interests as satisfied when getting the highest immediate returns, so that, at any 
decision  concerning  the  allocation  of  an  amount  of  resources,  directors  and 
managers would realise that an higher pie to one group implies a lower pie to 
another  group (e.g.,  an  higher  amount  of  salaries  to  employees,  or  an  higher 
44 M.L.  Smith,  J.Pfeffer,  D.M.Rousseau,  ‘Patient  Capital:  How  Investors  Contribute  to  (or 
Undermine) Relational Wealth’, in C.Lena and D. M. Rousseau (ed),  Relational Wealth (2000), 
261-76.   
45 Post, Preston, Sachs above n 18,  48.
46 Parkinson above n 5,  44 -9.
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amount of investments in environmental friendly technologies, may risk leading 
to a lower amount of after tax profits and to a lower amount of dividends for 
shareholders). In other words, the view that there may be situations when there is 
no economic case for inclusiveness implicitly assumes that there are situations 
when the choices by directors face a zero-sum game, in which the gains to one 
group equal the losses to another group. However,  this view appears to derive 
from a short-term perception because, inevitably, the shorter the duration of the 
relationship between one group and another the more various situations may be 
perceived as presenting a zero-sum game. By contrast, in the same situations, a 
strategic management perspective which considers close and stable relationships 
as key components of the organisational wealth (and thus of the business’ ability, 
ex ante, to continue to generate profits) would aim at minimising or avoiding the 
zero sum game, i.e. it would consider the continuous wealth creation for groups 
involved in the business activity as the best condition for shareholders’ possibility 
of getting continuous incomes from their shares47.  This conduct would find an 
exception – if the general criteria above identified to recognise the compatibility 
of  shareholders  interests  with  other  interests  were applied  -  only  towards  any 
individuals  or  groups  whose  interests  would  conflict  with  the  survival  and 
development  of  the business activity  over  time.  Nevertheless,  it  can be easily 
noted that all constituencies listed in s. 172(1) could only benefit from the survival 
and development of a company with whom they feel that they could enter into 
stable and mutually wealth creative relationships.     
           Globally considered, all elements indicated by s. 172(1) may thus, under 
the managerial perspective considered here,  indicate a precise notion of  ‘success 
of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole’. The success would 
coincide with company’s ability to ensure ex ante the optimal conditions in order 
for  shareholders’  right  to  continuing (future)  income flows to  be safeguarded, 
where these conditions lie in the capacity of finding a common purpose with all 
groups (listed in s. 172(1)) who affect the possibility for the business activity to 
continue  over  time,  and  consequently  they  lie  in  the  ability of  minimising  or 
avoiding the perception of zero-sum game situations and of building long-term, 
mutually  beneficial  relationships  with all  these groups.   It  is  evident  that  this 
notion  of  success  specifies  in  depth  the  conditions  in  order  for  the  long-term 
increase  in  value  (which  was  indicated,   on  its  own,  as  the  ‘success’  for  a 
commercial company)48 to be possible. Consequently, two questions arise, each 
subsequent to the other.   The first  question is  whether at  least  some directors 
could  end up having a personal interest  to give up the ‘short-term’ approach 
47 An example of a difference between the two perspectives can be found in the situation where a 
company decides to undertake a new activity that it  considers more promising as the old one. 
Under  the view that  there would be  no economic case for  inclusiveness  in  this  situation,  the 
management may believe that, to pursue shareholders’ interests, workforce employed in the old 
activity has to be dismissed to reduce the costs. There would thus be the perception of a zero-sum 
game situation (shareholders would gain, employees would loss). Under the strategic managerial  
perspective,   the  management  would  find  out  which  ‘transferable  skills’,  and  which  personal 
talents in terms of creativity, motivation and so on of the workforce employed in the old activity 
can be used in the new activity too, in order to help safeguarding one of the main stakeholders’ 
contribution to profit making by further enhancing the commitments of these workers to the goals 
of the company and their process of identification with the organisation  (and, thus, in order also to 
prevent the undesirable effects that would result from workers’ dismissals, in terms e.g. of workers 
and local communities diffusing a negative reputation and from skilled workers being hired by 
actual  or  potential  competitors).  There  would  thus  be  the  goal  of  minimising/avoiding  (the 
perception  of)  a  zero-sum  game  situation  (employees  would  need  not  to  loss,  in  order  for 
shareholders to continue to gain over time).   
48 Retro,  A, the definition by Lord Goldsmith. 
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reported in recent years and to adopt exactly the strategic management perspective 
in their understanding of s. 172(1). If so, the second question is whether or not this 
perspective can end up offering an input to the legal reasoning.
           II   DIRECTORS’ POTENTIAL INTEREST IN ADOPTING THE STRATEGIC
                   MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE
       
A The Interpretative Uncertainties and the Margins for the potential Directors’  
    Liability
     
      The  Explanatory  Notes  to  the  Companies  Act  2006  published  by  the 
Government49, suggest what can be the implication, for directors, of a failure to 
consider the factors listed in s. 172(1). The Notes state that the list, even though 
not exhaustive, highlights
    areas  of  particular  importance  which  reflect  expectations  of  responsible 
business behaviour,  such as the interests  of the company’s employees and the 
impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment…50. 
      In addition, they indicate that  the decision as to what will promote the success 
of the company, and what constitutes such success, is one for the director’s good 
faith  judgment51,  which  ensures  that  business  decisions  on,  e.g,  strategy  and 
tactics are for the directors, and not subject to decision by the court, subject to 
good faith52.  
      Lastly, the Notes go on to explain how the duty to promote the success of the 
company is to be exercised: in considering the factors listed in s. 172(1), the duty 
to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence laid down in s. 174 will apply53. 
The duty to exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence, in turn, is performed by 
exercising the same standards of care, skills and judgment that would be exercised 
by a reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge, skills and experience 
that may be expected for carrying out the same functions as the director in relation 
to the company at issue (an objective test), and with the general knowledge, skills 
and experience the director actually has (a subjective test)54. 
The implication as regards the exercise of the duty laid down by s. 172(1) is that 
it will not be sufficient to pay lip service to the factors and, in many cases, the 
directors will need to take actions to comply with this aspect of the duty. At the 
same time, the duty does not require a director to do more than good faith and the 
duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence would require, nor would it be 
possible for a directors acting in good faith to be held liable for a process failure  
which would not have affected his decision  as to which course of action would 
best promote the success of the company55.      
49 Companies Act 2006, Explanatory Notes (hereinafter: the Notes in the text, Note number in 
note) , available at http: www.ops.gov.uk/acts/en2006/ukpgaen20060046_en.pdf
 
50 Note 326, p. 50.
51 Note 327, p. 50
52 Ibid. 
53 Note 328, p. 51
54 See s. 174
55 Note 328, p. 51, emphasis added
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 These explanations, which echo those that were contained in the Guidance on 
Key Clauses56,  can be read as suggesting that a person of a reasonable care, skill 
and diligence would always consider the factors listed in s. 172(1) to be relevant 
exactly  because  (as  the  Notes  recognise)  these  factors  highlight  areas  of  
particular importance and – it may be added – they are so for any business. It was 
noted, while the reform was still in progress, that, 
  Customers,  employees  and  suppliers  are  strategic  stakeholders  because  no 
company can exist or operate without them. They must therefore be considered as 
an essential component of the “company as a whole” to whom directors owe their 
common law duties.  On this  reasoning there is  no need to  change the law to 
increase the duties of directors as the statutory law already allows directors to use 
their powers for “a proper purpose”57.   
  
        If this line of reasoning is followed, the Notes may be intended as explaining 
that the list of strategic factors – in addition to stakeholders such as customers, 
employees and suppliers – is to be extended at least to all other elements indicated 
in s. 172(1), and that this list serves to connect the proper purposes for which 
directors need to exercise their powers, dealt with in s. 17158, with the duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence laid down in s. 174. This would be 
so,  in  the  sense  that,  in  exercising  its  powers  for  the  proper  purpose  to  be 
identified in each circumstance, in accordance with s. 171, directors would need 
in any case to exercise reasonable care, skills and diligence (under s.  174) by 
having regard at  least  to the factors listed in s.  172(1),  due to  these elements 
indicating (always) areas of particular importance59.   
    In addition to explaining that the duty to exercise reasonable care, skills and 
diligence, and thus the objective test involved in this duty, will apply in having 
regard to the factors listed in s. 172(1), the Notes indicate the areas ‘where the 
statutory statement departs from current law’, and these areas do not include s. 
172(1)60. All this appears to confirm the submissions that the case-law developed 
before the introduction of the new Company Act will not lose its force and that 
the courts  will  be  able  to  use  objective  considerations  despite  the fact  that  s. 
172(1) refers only to the subjective element of ‘good faith’61.   The continuing 
relevance of the current case-law can also be inferred from the fact that the new 
statutory set of directors’ duties are based on and replace the existing common 
law rules and equitable principles62, and, as it was noted, from the statement in s. 
170(4) concerning the interpretation and application of the general duties63        On 
the other hand, the objective considerations available for the courts to use  could 
56 Guidance on the Key Clauses, para. 63 and 64.
57 Shann  Turnbull  (2005)  On  Line  Opinion,  ‘Enhancing  shareholder  value  with  social 
responsibility’, www.onlineopinion.com.au   
58 See s. 171 (b)
59 It can be said ‘at least’ because the factors indicated by s. 172(1) are not-exhaustive.
60  Notes 298 to 302, pp. 45 – 46.
61 Sarah Worthington, ‘Reforming Directors’ Duties’  (2001) 64  Modern Law Review 439, 456; 
Andrew Keay ‘Enlightened shareholders value, the reform of the duties of company directors and 
the corporate objective’  (2006) Lloyd’s Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly 335, 359. 
62 Ministerial Statements above n 4,  1, 4.
63 s. 170(4): ‘regard shall be had to the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles 
in interpreting and applying the general duties’; also, Burges Salmon, briefing ‘The Companies 
Act 2006: what does it mean for directors?’ (www.burges-salmon.com/publications/contents/The 
Companies Act 2006_BRM0126_02_07.pdf)  and Keay above n 61, 359.
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also be found, ultimately, in the areas which are objectively (i.e., for any business) 
of particular importance and which are listed by the statutory factors indicated by 
s. 172(1)64. 
    However,  a question might be raised on the basis of the explanation in the 
Notes that the duty does not require a director to do more than good faith and the 
duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence would require,  nor would it 
be possible for a directors acting in good faith to be held liable for a process 
failure which would not have affected his decision  as to which course of action 
would best  promote the  success of  the company65:  the  question appears  to  be 
whether these two implications will be intended as alternative or as cumulative 
(in the sense that the second implication, i.e. the lack of impact on the decision, 
serves to explain and thus to complement the first implication, i.e. the good faith 
and the reasonable care, skills and diligence). Assume that a director exercises the 
duty set out in s. 172(1) with a care, skill and diligence that he is sure would 
satisfy the objective and subjective tests ex s. 174, and, in so doing, identifies the 
important factors in those listed by s. 172(1), but, despite this, omits to analyse in 
depth the consequences of his intended decision on one of these factors, because 
he believes, ex ante, that anybody would consider it reasonable to foresee that this 
analysis would not alter the decision but would only be time-consuming. Assume 
also that, ex post, it is showed that the failure to analyse fully the factor in the 
decision-making has resulted in the overlooking of elements that would otherwise 
have been perfectly known ex ante, and that the failure to consider these elements 
in the decision-making process has caused an alteration of the decision to the 
detriment of the company, who may, e.g., have suffered a damage to reputation 
and  lost  some  customers.  The  question  would  be  whether  this  director  is 
vulnerable to liability for breach of duty.  The response would be in the negative if 
the two implications indicated by the Notes were alternative, because the director 
could say that he acted in good faith, and that the care, skills and diligence duty 
has  been  performed.  By  contrast,  this  response  would  be  positive  if  the  two 
implications were cumulative, because the failure in the decision-making process 
has affected the  decision on  the  course  of  action66.  The  right  response would 
appear to be the second one, in light of explanations offered by commentators 
who were also involved in the reform process.  It was clearly indicated that, in 
order  for  a  damage  to  non  shareholders  interests  to  determine  a  breach  of 
directors’ duties, a damage or potential damage to the company would need to be 
shown67. 
It was also said that the duty, which remains enforceable only by the company or 
in default by the shareholders if the requirement for bringing a derivative action 
are  satisfied,   also  distinguishes  between  the  obligation  to  identify  relevant 
factors, which must be performed with appropriate care, skills and diligence, and 
the decisions about how to act, which are matters for good faith judgment68. In 
conclusion, it was said that all this does not imply 
64 Davies, above n 14, 7, after arguing that it is extremely difficult to prove breach of a subjectively 
formulated  duty  such  as  the  duty  to  act  in  what  the  directors  thinks  it  is  in  good  faith, 
acknowledges that ‘it is true that the new requirement to take into account stakeholders interest in 
deciding what will promote the company’s success is formulated partly in an objective way…In 
theory,  therefore,  there  is  opened  up  a  new  avenue  of  attack  on  directors’decisions..’.   The 
statutory factors have been regarded, also by a major law firm, as expressing an objective test and 
importing CSR factors: infra, note 77.
65 Note 328, p. 51, emphasis added.
66 And, ex post, a damage to the company has occurred.
67 Parkinson above n 5, 55.
68 Ibid. 
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 that  the obligation to  have  regard to  wider  interests  is  for  practical  purposes 
unenforceable. For example, a company might make a decision that causes serious 
environmental  damage  without  giving  proper  prior  consideration  to  its 
environmental effects. If the decision result in loss to the company (it may incur 
environmental liabilities or lose sales following injury to its  reputation) and it 
could be shown that the failure to take account of the environmental implications 
of the decision was negligent, then in principle liability could ensue69. 
Although it may be objected that, in this explanation, the reference to ‘taking into 
account’  and to  the  ‘negligence’   seems to  indicate  a  case  different  from the 
example above indicated, a counter-argument could be pro-offered: the attention 
that is placed on the ex post consequence would seem to suggest that a negligence 
in the decision-making may consist of a lack of full analysis, after the factors have 
been identified. It was further explained that  ‘directors who act in good faith will 
not be held liable for failing to have regard to one of the factors  if this failure 
would not have altered their business decision’70. 
This would appear to confirm that the case of potential liability is one whether the 
failure to ‘have regard to’ one of the factors has occurred, (not only during but 
also) after the identification of the factors, in the subsequent phase of action. In 
this phase, the failure to ‘have regard to’ may be intended (no longer as a failure 
to identify but) as ‘failure to pay full attention’, and thus ‘failure to carry out a 
complete analysis’ which could have shown further elements to be considered at 
the  time  of  the  decision:  this  reading  appears  to  be  further  supported  by  the 
Ministerial  Statement  that  ‘have  regard  to’  means  ‘give  proper  consideration 
to..’71.    Therefore, although one could say that: 
the Government’s view is that, provided the directors make a decision in good 
faith  and have exercised reasonable care,  skills  and diligence  in  reaching that 
decision, it should not be open to challenge in the court. This would preserve the 
courts’ reluctance to overturn directors’ commercial decisions provided they have 
been made in good faith, commonly called the business judgment rule72
  
 and could add that the courts have made it clear in the past that they will not use 
hindsight in making their  decision when assessing directors’  actions73,  a  doubt 
would remain.  Precisely,  the fundamental  question appears  to  be  whether  any 
elements  that  could  have  been  known at  the  time of  the  decision  and  whose 
importance in the course of events could have been appreciated (if a full analysis 
had been carried out and had indicated these elements) may be seen by courts no 
longer  as  hindsight,  but  as  elements  to  be  used  to  assess  if  there  have  been 
omissions by directors. In consequence, the question also appears to be whether 
these elements will be taken to indicate a failure to exercise reasonable care, skills 
and diligence. An example may be made as regards the cases when the interests of 
the company and of stakeholders are indicated as contrasting with each others: the 
Ministerial Statements assert that ‘..it will sometime be necessary, for example, to 
lay off staff’74. It may be supposed that, ex ante, directors, after considering one 
69 Ibid.
70 Darling above n 15, emphasis added.
71 Ministerial Statements above n 4,  9, emphasis added.
72 http://www.nortonrose.com/knowledge/publications/2007/pub5860.aspx?page=13786&lang=en- 
gb (last accessed on  8 January 2008),  Norton Rose briefing ‘Companies act 2006: the impact 
on directors – update’,  under ‘Directors’ duties’. 
73 Keay above n 61, 355.
74 Ministerial Statements above n 4,  9
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by one all factors, identify in the dismissal of staff the appropriate course of action 
for reducing some costs in a time of uncertainty about the market trends for the 
company’s  products,  but  do so without  a  deep (and thus,  full)  analysis  of  all 
potential implications for the company, because they believe that any reasonable 
person in their  position would have taken the same decision and that  such an 
analysis, while time-consuming, would not have changed the decision. However, 
assume that,  ex  post,  directors  and  shareholders  realise  that  such  a  course  of 
action had  negative  consequences  for  the company.   Arguably,  this  course  of 
action  would  not  have  been  followed  if  the  strategic  management  approach 
highlighted  in  part  I  had  been  adopted,  because  this  approach  would  have 
suggested an assessment of employees’ interests as their interest to consider the 
company as the organisation with whom a mutually beneficial relationship can be 
built, and it would have suggested the in-depth analysis of employees’ skills and 
talents  that  could  have  still  been  useful  to  the  company75.  Assume  that  the 
negative  consequences  consist,  e.g.,  of  a  decrease  in  profit  that  exceeds  the 
reduction of costs and thus results in a loss, and that this has occurred for various 
reasons which would have known or easy to foresee, ex ante, if the deep analysis 
had been carried out.  The doubt whether – in this example and in other similar 
cases -  directors might no longer enjoy a protection such as the one offered by a 
business judgment  rule,  and may thus incur liability,  would appear to be well 
grounded, in light of at least three elements. 
      The first element can be identified in the fact that the ‘Guidance for company 
directors’  contained  in  the  Ministerial  Statements,  while  on  the  one  hand 
recommends directors  to  act in the company’s best interests, taking everything 
they think relevant into account, on the other hand also recommends them to ‘be 
diligent, careful and  well informed  about the company’s affairs’76. Thus, in the 
above example, it could be wondered whether directors took what they though it 
was relevant into account but without being well informed, because they were not 
aware of the circumstances that the full analysis would have otherwise made clear 
ex ante. It could also be wondered whether the fact of not being well informed 
will be regarded, despite any assertion by the directors concerned that they have 
exercised reasonable care, skills and diligence, as indication of failure to do so 
(after all,  the objective test  for the duty of care is  what a  reasonably diligent  
person would  have done,  rather  than  what  directors  believe that  a  reasonably 
diligent person would have done).   
      The second element lies in the views, expressed by some major law firms in 
recent client briefings,  that the factors listed in s. 172(1) constitute an objective 
test which imports wider CSR factors into the decision- making,  that directors 
must take care to consider the potential relevance of each of the factors and that, 
once  satisfied  of  this,  courts  are  unlikely  to  interfere  with  the  result  of  the 
decisions77.  The  ‘potential  relevance’  needs  to  be  intended,  apparently,  in  the 
75                  Retro, part I, B 2 and note 47.
76 Emphasis added, quotes from Ministerial Statements above n 4,  2
77 E.g., Norton Rose,  above n. 72, expressly states that the factors listed s. 172(1) constitute an 
objective test and  import wider CSR factors in the issues directors must consider when making 
decisions, and that it is clear that the Government ‘expects to see actions, and not merely words, in 
the exercise of this new duty’; Travers Smith, in its briefings on the Companies Act 2006 ( ‘The 
Companies  Act  2006  Directors’  duties  public  companies’, 
http://www.traverssmith.com/assets/pdf/Legal_Briefings/TheCompaniesAct2006-Directorsduties-
publiccompanies.Nov2007.pdf,  and  ‘The  Companies  Act  2006  Directors’duties  private 
companies’,  http://www.traverssmith.com/assets/pdf/Legal_Briefings/TheCompaniesAct2006-
Directorsduties- privatecompaniesNov2007.pdf,  both lastly accessed on 8 January 2008) also sees 
in the new duty a reflection of the Government’s agenda for CSR;  Gary Milner -Moore and 
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sense of potential impact, because the factors can be said to be relevant due to the 
fact  in  itself  that  they  reflect  (as  stated  by  the  Notes)  areas  of  particular 
importance. The briefings also suggested that lengthier board minutes may serve 
as an evidence that the statutory elements have been considered, and that the more 
active shareholders may challenge decisions, even for the mere purpose of seeking 
publicity  of the decision-making,  by means of  the new derivative actions that 
under Part 11 of the Act they are allowed to bring for negligence78. 
    The third element is the fact that, although the case-law developed before the 
introduction of the Companies Act can be expected not lo loose its force,  the 
clarification of the law concerning director’s duties, that is being indicated as the 
goal  of  the  new codification,  leaves  open  all  margins in  the  future  case-law 
concerning  this  ‘clarification’79.   In  other  words,  the  relevance  that  the  pre-
existing case-law can be expected to maintain does not eliminate the uncertainty 
created, for the time being, by the lack of judicial precedents on s. 172(1).   
      
B The convenient Conduct from Directors’ viewpoint
   
    In light of the situation of uncertainty above described, directors would need to 
consider that there may be occasions when asserting that they acted in good faith 
may  not  be  sufficient  to  prevent  litigations  brought  against  them from being 
successful.  In  the  light  of  the  Notes,  of  the  explanations  and of  the  lawyers’ 
positions  above  recalled,  they  would  need  to  consider  that  the  alteration  of 
business decision as a result of their failure to fully analyse ex ante the impact on 
one of the factors may fall within the occasions when litigation against them risks 
being successful. This may be expected to be the case when a damage or potential 
damage to the company can be shown ex post and would have been realistically 
predictable  ex  ante  in  light  of  circumstances,  relating  to  a  factor  not  fully 
considered or in other words not fully analysed, that would otherwise have been 
known at the time of the decision. Nevertheless, it  can be remarked again that 
whether or not the failure to ‘have regard to’ one of the factors listed by s. 172(1) 
has altered directors’  business decisions,  and actually  resulted in  a  damage or 
potential damage to the company, can be realised only ex post, whereas directors 
can be expected to have the interest, ex ante, to minimise the risk of (successful) 
actions brought against them and even to discourage such actions.  
        For those directors who have been adopting a short-term approach (without 
paying due attention to what are currently the statutory factors) up to the present 
time,  the fact that any implications for the company of a failure to ‘have regard 
to’ one of the factors listed in s. 172(1)  can be verified only ex post  means that 
continuing with such the short term approach may involve, ex ante, a degree of 
risk of liability for breach of s. 172(1). This would occur unless they can always 
be sure that shareholders of the companies they run perceive the ‘success of the 
Rupert Lewis, Herbert Smith,  “In the Line of Fire” -Directors Duties under the Companies Act 
2006 (hereafter  “In  the Line  of  Fire”),  http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/B65D78B4-
23E8-463E-8D51-9E893A0705E7/3831/IntheLineofFire.pdf,  3  (lastly  accessed  on  8  January 
2008) argue that, once satisfied that directors have taken care to consider the factors, the courts are 
unlikely the interfere in the decisions made as a result.  
78 Ibid Milner Moore and Lewis p. 4; also ibid Travers Smith  p. 5.
79 About the intended clarification of the law on directors’ duties, see retro, part I, A and Note 301, 
p.45 and 46,  which recalls  the Company Law Review recommendations of  providing ‘greater 
clarity of what is expected of directors and make the law more accessible’ and explains that the 
Government accepted these recommendations.  
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company’  only when getting the  highest  immediate  returns  irrespective  of  the 
longer  term  outcomes,  since,  in  this  case,  directors  following  a  short-term 
approach can realistically expect no litigation against them.  However, as regards 
listed companies, it may not be easy to know when this is  the case.  Although the 
UK  listed  sector  has  been  described  as  characterised  by  a  wide  dispersal  of 
shareholdings, with many shareholders regarding investment in companies merely 
as  short  term  financial  opportunities  and  with  a  resulting  environment 
unsupportive of long-term commitments80,   it  has been also noted that the last 
thirty years have witnessed a drop in individual investors’ ownership of shares 
from 53% in 1963 to 14% in 2002 and a dramatic increase of share ownerships by 
institutional investors, for many of which a longer term approach is appropriate81. 
On the other hand, as regards non listed and in general closely held companies, 
the  greater  the  importance  of  companies’  dividends  on  shareholders’  overall 
personal income, the greater the extent to which shareholders can be expected to 
wish these dividends to continue and possibly to increase over time, and thus to 
take a long-term perspective. These circumstances, together with the uncertainties 
above highlighted  as  regards  potential  cases  of  liability,  contribute  to  a  clear 
conclusion.. 
      The conclusion is that, ex ante, the most effective manner for directors to 
discourage actions against them and thus to minimise/avoid the risk of liability for 
breach of s. 172(1)  is to read the new provision as ‘advising’ them that, in order 
to effectively insulate themselves from the risk of litigation and liability,  it  is  
always convenient to fully analyse the long term consequences of their decisions  
and thus to consider all non shareholders interests listed  in the provision. This 
means to ‘internalise’ the requirements of s. 172(1) and, from the viewpoint of 
directors not already following this approach and who wish to discourage ex ante 
litigations against them, can be translated into three key questions, interconnected 
to each others: how can the requirements of s. 172(1) be properly internalised, i.e. 
how can the elements listed in s. 172(1) be given ‘proper consideration’82 in the 
decision-making; which are,  in the various situations where decisions under s. 
172(1) need to be taken, the  relevant factors  not to be overlooked; what is the 
most effective manner to properly internalise the requirements of s. 172(1) and to 
act  by considering in full  all relevant factors. Arguably, if  directors found the 
reply  to  each  of  these  three  questions  and  managed  ex  ante  to  transmit  to 
shareholders  the  message  that  they  acted  accordingly,  any  scrutiny  of  the 
directors’ decisions could only come to the assessment that directors have not 
breached s. 172(1).    
      As regards the first question, once accepted that the ‘strategic consultancy’ 
directors can draw from s. 172(1) is that, for their benefit (to minimise the risk of 
liability),  the long-term consequences of their decisions and the other statutory 
elements should always be fully analysed, and that lengthier board minutes may 
be useful as evidence that directors have (so) considered the statutory factors, it 
follows that the best evidence for this purpose could be given (not by minutes 
containing  a  mere  box-ticking  reference,  but)  by  an  analysis  of  these  factors 
carried out in the  light of all circumstances that relate to any of them and that  
could have been known by the directors.  This analysis could be expected to be 
80 Parkinson above n 5,  58
81 Christine Mallin,  Corporate Governance (2004), 65: the longer term approach appears to be 
appropriate  for  many  institutional  investors,  as  the  option  of  selling  their  shares,  in  case  of 
dissatisfaction with directors’ choices, is not viable given their shareholdings’ size or a policy of 
holding a balanced portfolio.
82 As required by the Ministerial Statements: Ministerial Statements note 4 above, p. 9.
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most effective if the requirements of s. 172(1) were internalised as an indication 
of the way in which a company can be properly run.   This  may lead the board to 
decisions where the satisfaction of the interests of shareholders are perceived as 
not conceivable without the consideration of the wider interests listed in s. 172(1). 
As a result,  this  would also make it  possible to produce,  as evidence that  the 
statutory factors have been considered, board minutes containing an analysis of 
these factors carried out in the light of all circumstances which could be known at 
the  time  of  the  decision,  and  demonstrating  that  the  analysis  has  guided  the 
decisions. Directors could show, in so doing, that they have followed an approach 
taking into consideration all constituencies which can lead to the success of the 
company  for  the  benefit  of  shareholders,  and  thus  to  the  maximisation  of 
shareholders’ interests intended as continuation of the dividends flows over time, 
which would mean effective protection of shareholders’ rights to future incomes.  
    As regards the relevant factors not to be overlooked in taking into consideration 
the constituencies listed in s. 172(1), directors would need to consider a key fact: 
in any business decisions that impact upon one or more of the categories listed in 
s. 172(1), there is inevitably the risk of negative reactions on their part if these 
constituencies fell themselves adversely affected. The more the contribution of 
these categories is important for the performance of the company (importance that 
can be perceived, e.g., in the need to maintain the trust on the part of suppliers, to 
keep skilful  employees etc..),  the more the risk of negative reactions by these 
categories could result in a withdrawal of the contribution of these categories that 
results  in  negative  consequences  in  the  long term,  i.e.  that  could  prevent  the 
company  from  continuing  a  successful  performance.  Accordingly,  it  can  be 
argued that the relevant factors not to be overlooked are  those elements that, in  
each  individual  situation,  can  minimise  and  can  possibly  avoid  the  risk  of  
withdrawal of important contributions to the company in the strategic areas which 
are of particular importance to any business and which are listed in s.  172(1). 
These elements could not be identified and fully analysed without an open and 
inclusive decision making approach with the stakeholders groups indicated in that 
provision, based on a transparent communication with them, that should make it 
possible to ‘monitor’  the degree of satisfaction of all  those without whom the 
company’s continuing success for shareholders’ benefit would not be possible. It 
was already demonstrated in the literature83, before the introduction of the new 
Companies  Act  and  again  more  recently84,  that  a  fundamental  component  of 
directors’ duty needs to be identified in the assessment of the risk incumbent on 
their companies and in the creation and supervision of systems for the control of 
this risk, which could be achieved only by means of extensive consultation with 
those concerned by the decisions to be taken.  This position can be fully supported 
–  and  complemented  -  by   recognising  that  the  general  risk  on  the  business 
activity is the risk of withdrawal of the contributions to its continuing existence by 
the  various  constituencies,  and  that  whatever  system of  risk  control  needs  to 
minimise  this  general  risk.  The  relevant  factors  for  this  purpose,  identified 
through  a  full  analysis  based  on  an  open  and  inclusive  decision  –  making 
approach  (which  make  it  possible  to  ‘internalise’  the  concerns  of  the 
constituencies listed in s. 172(1)), need to be properly reflected, in turn, by the 
choices made in the organisational and financial management of the company. To 
83 Janet Dine, ‘Risks and Systems: A New Approach to Corporate Governance and the European 
Employee  Consultation  Structure?’  (2001)  3  International  and  Comparative  Corporate  Law 
Journal 299 
84 Dine above n 10, 48. 
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monitor  the  effectiveness  and  appropriateness  of  those  choices,  the  internal 
control and internal audit function would need to be fully enhanced, given the key 
role that it plays in so doing85.    
       The response to the third question – what is the  most effective manner to 
properly internalise the requirements of s. 172(1) and  to act by considering all 
relevant factors – lies exactly in the strategic management perspective described 
in the previous part86. This follows from the responses to the first two questions: 
in fact, if directors would need to consider the company as properly run when 
taking into consideration all those constituencies upon whom the protection of 
shareholders’ rights to continuous incomes ultimately depends, and if the relevant 
factors are those elements that can minimise and avoid the risk of withdrawal of 
important contributions to the company by these constituencies, there is a most 
effective and efficient manner to do so (and to allow an open and transparent 
communication approach to work). This manner consists inevitably of building 
long-term relationships of mutual trust and benefit with both shareholders and all 
other  constituencies  listed  in  s.  172(1).  In  fact,  the  perception,  by  those 
stakeholders, of the company concerned as the organisation that they can trust on 
a long-term basis, and with whom they thus can find a common sense of purpose, 
can help the stakeholders in assessing their own interest as satisfied not mainly 
when getting the highest immediate returns, but when getting continuous returns 
over  time  from their  contributions  (whether  these  consist  in  the  provision  of 
labour, of goods or services, of finance etc..). Ultimately, what can at a first sight 
be sometime perceived as contrasting interest could thus no longer be regarded as 
such once a long – term perspective is introduced and internalised by all parties. 
This can facilitate the task of directors in properly considering all factors listed in 
s. 172(1). The building of long-term relationships is exactly what follows from 
adopting the strategic management perspective, and, thus, from ‘internalising’ the 
concept of ‘success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole’ 
that can be extrapolated from it. To do this, which would mean to aim to ensure ex 
ante the optimal conditions in order for shareholders’ right to future income flows 
to be safeguarded, directors would need to identify the manner which can allow 
them to get the most out of the open and inclusive decision-making approach, or, 
in other words,  to get the most out of each constituency. Because this approach 
inevitably would require a broad view of the expectations of each constituency, 
arguably this manner can be found in a dual course of action. On the one hand, 
directors could see the continuation of the business activity over time with the 
persistent  satisfaction  of  constituencies  as  the  criteria  that,   when  taking  the 
decisions going beyond day-to-day operations, can be used to unify the advice 
they can take from lawyers with the advice they can take from other professionals 
most  directly  related to businesses,  such as the accountancy professionals,  the 
marketing  consultants,  the  human  resources  consultants  and,  in  general,  the 
strategic management consultants. Because each of these professional categories 
can suggest directors a series of performance’s indicators (e.g., the accountancy 
profession would suggest considering the evolution over time of indicators that 
complement each others, such as gross margin, operating profits, etc87 ; human 
resources  consultancy  would  suggest  the  factors  affecting  satisfaction  of 
employees and related indicators concerning their fidelity; marketing consultancy 
could propose the most effective strategies to acquire and retain customers etc...), 
85 Alex  Dunlop (ed), Corporate Governance and Control (1998),  13 - 79. 
86 Retro, par. I 
87 See, e.g., Dimitris N. Chorafas, IFRS, Fair Value and Corporate Governance (2006), 343.
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directors  would  eventually  be  equipped  with  the  tools  to  appreciate  how  the 
satisfaction  of  the  requests  expressed  by  shareholders  and  other  stakeholders 
could favourably impact on these indicators. The significance of these indicators, 
ultimately, would be to help88 to monitor the company’s continuing success.  On 
the other  hand,  directors  –  even in  closer  or  smaller  companies  –  can  find  it 
convenient,  to  better  interact  with  a  broader  range  of  practitioners  and 
consultancies  specialising  in  different  sectors  that  are  all  important  for  the 
company’s  operation and performance,  and  to  unify the  advice  received  from 
different categories of professionals, to increase their own level of competences. 
This would allow them to adopt an integrated legal, economic-financial and social 
view  of  the  implications  of  their  decisions  and,  in  so  doing,  to  form and  to 
exercise  their  own  independent  judgment  in  identifying  the  actions  that  will 
promote the success of the company. They would thus in a better position (than 
would  be  the  case  without  this  integrated  view)  to  successfully  perform  the 
general  duty  laid  down  by  s.  173  too,  i.e.  the  duty  to  exercise  independent 
judgment89.  This  latter,  in  light  of  the  explanations  in  the  Notes  about  the 
relationship between the duties, can in fact be seen - just like the other general 
duties - as normally overlapping with the duty in s. 172(1)90, and the Ministerial 
Statements  indicate  that  ‘..the  obtaining  of  outside  advice  does  not  absolve 
directors from exercise their judgment on the basis of such advice’91. The broad 
and  integrated  legal,  economic-financial  and  social  view  and  their  own 
competences, in addition to allowing directors to unify the advice from different 
professional categories and to form their own independent judgment,  would also 
be an important ‘assets’ in preventing (the perception of) possible downsides in 
their decisions. They could in fact use a combination of legal, economic-financial 
and social elements to construct complete and coherent arguments, that they could 
then use for a twofold purpose: to transmit to each stakeholders group listed in s. 
172(1) the message that its ultimate concerns are safeguarded by the decision-
making process; to give shareholders, ex ante, a demonstration that no negligence 
incurred in the decision-making process and that the success of the company for 
shareholders’  benefit  as  a  whole  was  always  the  goal  that  motivated  the 
substantive consideration given to  factors listed in s.  172(1).   In  other  words, 
directors  could  use  the  arguments  that  they  could  draw  from  a  broad  legal, 
economic-financial  and  social  view  (and  thus,  ultimately,  from  the  strategic 
management perspective that underlies such view),  to transmit shareholders the 
message  that  the  safeguard  of  other  constituency  interests  is  always  being 
regarded  as  the  optimal  conditions  in  order  to  get  the  most  out  of  each 
constituency in terms of its contribution to the protection of shareholders’ rights to 
continuing dividends flows92.  
             It may certainly be objected that there may be shareholders who continue 
to assess their own interests as satisfied when they get the most immediate returns 
irrespective of the long-term prosperity of the company, and that they may try to 
take steps to initiate derivative litigation against directors who adopt the long-term 
88 Together with the perception of the satisfaction of stakeholders and thus of their continuing 
willingness to contribute to the company’s business activity.
89  S. 173(1).
90 See Note 311 (the relationship between the duties), 48
91 Ministerial Statements above n 4, 9. 
92 Or, in other words, to trasmit shareholders the message that ‘Because the survival and success of 
the  corporation  is  dependent  upon  strategic  stakeholders  it  is  very  much  in  the  interest  of 
shareholders to have them recognised and bonded to the corporation..’: S.Turnbull, above n 57. 
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strategic managerial perspective. Specifically, it might be said that this may occur 
when these shareholders believe that they could have elements to argue, e.g.,  that, 
if  directors  had  taken  a  short  term  perspective  and  given  priority  to  their 
immediate returns over the other factors listed in s. 172(1), the profit in the last 
financial  year would have been higher.   Nevertheless, apart  from the fact  that 
lawyers would probably have advised these shareholders,  in any case,  that  the 
derivative litigation would  be unsuccessful93, this could not but hold even truer in 
the case at stake, as directors’ response to these shareholders could be easy and 
convincing. This response, in light of the managerial competence that directors 
could have built, could be articulated at least in three points. First, the directors 
concerned may assert that the emphasis on the short-term that was reported as 
prevailing in recent  years94 was probably ‘based on a misunderstanding of the 
current law’95,  which thus had to be understood as requiring the promotion of 
shareholders’ interests on a long-term basis96. This – they may explain - would not 
have been possible if consequences on the future (i.e., long-term) prosperity of the 
business, and thus on the stakeholders groups affecting it and listed in s. 172(1), 
had been neglected. Second,  they may explain that an economic data such as the 
profit relating to the last financial year is an ex post measure without meaning if 
considered in isolation, but can only acquire significance in an examination over 
time and in comparison with the data concerning the company’s competitors. In 
this regard, this examination can already be expected ex ante to support directors’ 
inclusive long-term approach because it was generally recognised,  by the UK 
Government too, that the CSR, which would lead exactly to the internalisation of 
the concerns expressed by the stakeholders categories listed in s. 172(1),  makes 
businesses more competitive, and not less97. Lastly, directors may argue that they 
decided to attach importance to the satisfaction of the interests listed in s. 172(1) 
to avoid being negligent  and in the good faith awareness that,  the more these 
constituencies contribute to the business activity, the more the shares are of value 
to their owners, because shareholders’ rights to future income are better protected. 
Therefore,  in  the  event  of  shareholders  adopting  a  short-term  view  and  of 
directors adopting the strategic managerial perspective, it would appear that these 
directors could be able not only to become virtually invulnerable to ‘complaints’ 
and to potential actions, but also to ‘invite’ these shareholders to ‘rethink’ the 
assessment of their own interests.              
   
      III. A POTENTIAL INPUT TO THE LEGAL REASONING AND TO THE
MODEL OF COMPANIES ?
     
93 Given that courts have generally been hostile to derivative claims: Lean S. Sealy ‘Problems of 
Standing,  Pleading  and  Proof  in  Corporate  Litigation’  in  Ben  Pettet  (ed),  Company  Law  in 
Change,  Current  Legal  Problems (1987),  12.  Lawyers  could  also  advise  that  the  derivative 
litigation has only a tactical purpose of obtaining publicity of decisions: retro, A. The explanations 
that directors could formulate, which are referred to in the text, apply in this case too. 
94 Retro, part  I
95 John Birds,  ‘The reform of  directors’  duties’,  in  John de Lacy (ed),  The reform of  United 
Kingdom company law (2002), 159. Also, Davies, above  n 14, said that ‘..in my view, common 
law  never  required  short  –  terminism..’  .  The  CLRGS  had  evidence  that  the  law  was 
misunderstood: Company Law Review, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The 
Strategic Framework (1999), para. 5.1.1., 39-41.
96 Ibid Birds.
97 See Web Site www.csr.gov.uk/pdf/dti_csr_final.pdf,  and link businesscasecsr.shtml 
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    In the previous part, it has been argued that, in light of the explanations that 
have been put forward in terms of consequences in the event of failure to consider 
one or more of the factors listed, directors who wish to minimise or avoid the risk 
of (successful) actions against them could well find the adoption of a long-term, 
strategic managerial perspective to be in their own benefit.  
      In consequence, could this perspective offer an input to the legal reasoning 
and to the model of companies underpinning UK company law ? As indicated in 
part II98,  one may reasonably expect that a  director who transmits  ex ante the 
message that he has adopted the strategic managerial perspective, and explains the 
reasons for doing so, will not even be sued as the company and its shareholders 
could most  probably come to  the only conclusion that  he has not  breached s. 
172(1).   Nonetheless,  for the purpose of proposing a response to the question 
about  the  input  to  the  legal  reasoning,  one  may  either  consider  a  situation, 
however unlikely, in which this director is sued, or  assume a situation in which a 
director explains ex post, i.e. after he finds himself sued before a court, that he has 
adopted  the  strategic  management  perspective,   thus  that  he  has  regarded  the 
safeguards  of  the  constituencies  listed  in  s.  172(1)  as  always  necessary  for 
promoting the success of the company (according to the conception of success 
indicated by the strategic managerial perspective). In either cases, one can also 
assume that this line of argument is convincingly presented by his lawyers. The 
possibility  of  a  lawyer  proposing the  strategic  management  perspective as the 
most correct  interpretation of s.  172(1) is linked to the physiological  fact  that 
lawyers’ arguments, which can lead to creative and innovative developments in 
any area of law99,  are designed to present an interpretation of the law that serves 
their  clients’  interests.  This,  in  the  case  at  stake,  could  lead  the  lawyer  – 
irrespective of what can be his personal view on the fairness of s. 172(1) - to 
present the interpretation suited to the interest of the director who has adopted that 
perspective  in  taking  the  decisions.  An  additional  reason  suggests  why  this 
scenario would not appear to be (so) unrealistic: a major law firm has publicly 
regarded  s.  172(1)  as  no  more  than  a  codification  of  existing  good  practice 
developed before  the  new Company Act100,  and  these  views  may affect  other 
lawyers. The strategic management perspective adopted by the client (the director 
that,  by assumption,  is sued before a court)  could thus be seen by the lawyer 
concerned as no more than an accurate specification of how the good practices, 
already developed  before  the new Company Act, should be described in detail. 
Accordingly, the lawyer concerned could find an additional reason to affirm that 
the common law rules developed before the new law to interpret directors’ duty to 
act  in good faith continue to apply101 and that s.  172(1) offers the occasion to 
better develop or specify these rules.  It seems then reasonable that a court hearing 
these  arguments,  and  the  (strategic  management)  argument  that  any  decision 
aimed at ensuring the success of the company should have regard to its effect on 
stakeholders’  willingness  to  continue  to  offer  its  contribution  to  the  business 
98  As indicated retro, part II, B.     
99 Michael J. Powell, Professional Innovation: Corporate Lawyers and Private Lawmaking, (1993) 
18  Law and Social Inquiry, 423,  426 – 9, summarises various examples in the tax area, in the 
commercial area, in the areas of  bankruptcy and takeover.  
100 Herbert Smith has commented, as regards the factors listed by s. 172(1), that ‘Most would 
acknowledge that  a  responsible  director  should have  regard  to  these  factors  and  many others 
besides whenever called upon to form a decision’, Milner-Moore and Lewis, Herbert Smith, above 
n 76,  2 
101 Which position has already been taken by the literature and can be inferred from the Notes: 
retro, part II, A.
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activity, looks at the case-law developed before the introduction of s. 172(1). As 
regards  this  case-law,  two  trends  were  already  demonstrated,  long  before  the 
passing of the new law. 
     The first is that UK courts were moving away from the narrow contractual 
view  of  companies,  as  a  number  of  cases  involved  ‘the  extension  of  the 
“umbrella”  of  the  company  to  cover  interests  other  than  the  shareholders’ 
interest’102. In this respect, after the introduction of the Act, it was shown again 
that,  before  the  new law,  the  shareholders’  primacy approach did  not  emerge 
unequivocally  from the  case-law,  because,  together  with  cases  suggesting that 
focus should be on shareholders, 103  there are other cases suggesting that directors 
must run the company by considering the interests of stakeholders, such as the 
Dawson International Plc v. Coats Paton Plc (No 1 case)104. As it was noted, in 
the Court’s statement in that case that ‘directors are under a fiduciary duty to the 
company to have regard to inter alia the interests of members and employees’ the 
wording ‘inter alia’ seemed, implicitly, to indicate that members and others were 
only two of  a  number of categories whose interests  need to be considered by 
directors105.
    The second trend was a change in focus, in the judiciary’s techniques used in 
combating improper directorial  conduct,  from a determination of whether such 
conduct  was  in  good  faith  to  a  determination  of  whether  it  was  for  proper 
purposes. The latter test allowed courts to rely on objective criteria: it was noted 
that, as a result of this shift in focus, although directors may have acted honestly 
in what they believe to be the company’s interests, they may nevertheless be liable 
to the company if they have exercised their powers for a purpose different from 
that for which powers were conferred upon them106.  
      These trends confirm that corporate governance is in ‘a state of flux’107 and 
that,  when dealing with the  issue  of  the  meaning  of  acting in  the  company’s 
interests,  ‘the  courts  have  cleverly  fudged  the  answer’108 up  to  present.  In 
consequence,  there would appear to be no reason why a court who hears a well 
explained strategic management argument, and who is induced to take a position 
on it due to the arguments presented by the lawyer concerned, could not (cleverly) 
find, just in the strategic management perspective, two decisive elements. 
     One could be a ‘proper purpose’ of general application, which would be so 
irrespective of what the proper purposes invoked in the particular circumstances 
may be. This generally applicable proper purpose that the strategic managerial 
perspective would ‘recommend’, and without which the proper purposes at issue 
in  any  particular  case  concerning  ongoing  businesses  could  not  be  achieved, 
would lie in the survival and development of the business activity over time, and 
thus in the maintaining of the contributions (at  least) of all factors listed in s. 
172(1)  to  the  business  activity.  The  maintaining  of  these  contributions  –  the 
director and the lawyer concerned may well argue – is the best condition for the 
‘long-term increase in value’ that was regarded as the success of the company in 
102 Janet Dine, ‘Private Property and Corporate Governance Part II: Content of Directors’ Duties 
and Remedies’, in  Fiona McMillan Ptfield (ed), ‘Perspectives on Company Law’ (1995), 115; 
Bruce Butcher, ‘Directors’ Duties in the Twenty-First Century: A New Beginning ?’ (2000) 2 
International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 197, 202. 
103 Keay, above n 61,  343-4.
104 Ibid; 1988 SLT 854; [1989] BCLC 233.
105 Keay above n  61,  344 
106 Butcher  above n 102,  207-8.
107 John  Armour,  Simon  Deakin  and  Suzanne  J.  Konzelmann,  ‘Shareholder  Primacy  and  the 
Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance’,  (2003) British Journal of Industrial Relations 531. 
108 John Lowry, Alan Dignam, Company Law (2nd  ed, 2003), 292.
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the Ministerial Statements109. Once satisfied, by the explanations obtained, that the 
actions by the director concerned satisfy the generally applicable proper purpose, 
the court could thus be in a better position to assess the proper purposes at issue in 
the particular case. 
        Another element could be what was recently perceived as lacking in the 
statement whereby ‘.business decisions on, for example, strategy and tactics are 
for directors, and not subject to decision by the court, subject to good faith’110: a 
definite standards against which the actions of directors alleging that they acted in 
good faith can be assessed or, in other words, an objective standpoint to for any 
directors’  claim  that  they  acted  in  good  faith111.  Specifically,  this  objective 
standpoint would lie – consistently with the strategic management perspective, 
and  with  the  generally  applicable  proper  purpose  above  indicated  –  on  the 
foreseeable  effect  of  the  action  concerned  on  the  possibility  of  the  business 
activity’s survival and development over time and, thus, at least on those factors, 
listed in s. 172(1), that contribute to this survival and development and that are 
affected by the various decisions. The director concerned and his lawyer could 
well argue that these interests were internalised in the decision-making (which 
was  fully  informed  about  the  company’s  affairs  due  to  the  approach  that  it 
adopted)  in  order  to  do  all  what  was  possible,  ex  ante,  to  preserve  these 
stakeholders’ contributions and thus to avoid a potential damage to the company . 
Thus,  one could say that the strategic managerial perspective would offer exactly 
a generally valid objective standpoint, and that only this perspective can offer an 
objective input not only to affirm that no negligence occurred in the decision-
making, but also to test even any assertion that directors may make that they acted 
in good faith.  In other words,  this perspective,  if  adopted and well  explained, 
appears to be able to interconnect a generally applicable ‘proper purpose’ and the 
‘good faith’. This would be so despite the fact that the ‘proper purposes’ test, 
before the new Act, was reported to have application where directors’ good faith 
was not challenged112. However, such a development would be consistent with the 
Notes when, in explaining the normally cumulative effects of the general duties, 
they state that ‘..where more than one duty applies, the director must comply with 
each applicable duty, and the duty must be read in this context. So, for example, 
the duty to promote the success of the company will not authorise the director to 
breach his duty to act within powers, even if he considers that it would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company’113. It could be argued that the duty 
to act in good faith to do what the directors believe will promote the success of the 
company, if the success is intended according to the concept suggested by the 
strategic managerial perspective114, would never lead directors to breach the duty 
to act within powers and for the proper purposes which could characterise the 
specific  situations  of  an  ongoing  business.  This  simply  because  these  powers 
relating to a going concern business would be purposeless in the situations where, 
without  the  concern  for  the  survival  and  development  of  the  business 
recommended  by  the  strategic  managerial  perspective,  the  existence  of  the 
business activity came to an end.  
109 Retro, Ministerial Statements above n 4,  7 
110 This  statement  is  contained in  the Notes  (retro,  part  II,  Note  327,  p.  50),  which echo the 
Guidance on the Key Clauses previously published (clause 64).  
111 Keay above n 61,  358. 
112 Butcher above n 102, 208. 
113 Note 313, p. 48. 
114 Retro, part I, C. 
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      For all these reasons, it seems that directors become virtually ‘invulnerable’ 
once they can explain that they acted in good faith because, by adopting an open 
and  inclusive  approach  to  decision-making  aimed  at  building  long-term 
relationships with the groups listed in s. 172(1) (consistently with the generally 
applicable proper purpose) and at transmitting to those constituencies the message 
that their interests be safeguarded by the action at stake,  they had acquired all  
elements that could be known, ex ante, to believe that the action would promote  
the (long-term) success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole 
(where this success relates to the optimal conditions for protecting shareholders’ 
rights to future income). Ultimately, the strategic management perspective would, 
thus, fit well with the Notes’ statement that ‘it will not be sufficient to pay lip 
service to the factors’115: it would, in fact, suggest that, only if the consideration of 
the  statutory  factors  listed  there  always  goes  much  beyond  a  lip  service,  it 
becomes possible to minimise the future risk on the business activity and thus to 
minimise, a priori, the risk of damage or potential damage to the company and to 
shareholders’ benefits (and, from directors’ viewpoint, to become ‘invulnerable’ 
to the risk of liability for breach of duty).   
     Shortly, it can thus be submitted that, in light of the trends in the case-law 
already developed and on what appears to be the current uncertainties about s. 
172(1), the strategic management perspective, and the notion of success of the 
company  that  can  be  extrapolated  from this  perspective,  has  the  potential  of 
offering an input to legal reasoning in the English legal system more than it would 
have  in  a  civil  law  system.  In  fact,  as  the  courts  incorporate  the  arguments 
presented by lawyers into a binding precedent, those arguments ultimately have a 
decisive  role  in  leading  to  creative  and  even  unforeseen  developments116. 
Consequently,  such  developments  could  include  the  strategic  management 
viewpoint and the notion of success of the company that this viewpoint would 
suggest117, if these lines of reasoning were in the arguments presented. Of course, 
whether this input will be actually offered would seem to depend on directors’ 
ability  to  ‘internalise’  this  perspective,   and thus to  go beyond the  short-term 
perceptions that have been indicated in recent years. In turn, this ability can be 
expected to depend on the personal cultural background,  on the social context in 
which  each  director  finds  himself  to  operate  and  on  the  quality  of  its 
communication with lawyers and with other business professionals with whom the 
company normally interacts.  
   The literature has argued that, particularly in common law jurisdictions, ‘legal 
boxes’ have been construed and have caused, e.g., ‘company law’ to be seen as a 
separate discipline from ‘labour law’, ‘ignoring the fact...that the huge majority of 
employees  work  for  companies  and  that  companies  cannot  work  without 
employees’  and thus  ‘resulting in  a  closure  of  a  legal  system which prevents 
relevant social data from playing its proper part’118:  if  ‘legal boxes’ have been 
construed amongst areas of law, it appears unsurprising that ‘cultural boxes’ may 
have (even unwittingly) been construed between law and other disciplines, e.g. 
between  law  and  management.  Accordingly,  it  appears  unsurprising  that  the 
connection between two perspectives of analysis of s. 172(1), such as the legal 
perspective and the managerial one, may not appear immediate to directors and to 
115 Retro, part 2, Note 328, p. 51. 
116 Powell above n  99,  426 - 8.
117 Retro, part I.
118  Dine, above n 10, 66. 
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their professional advisers119. In this context, as regards the quality and the effects 
of the communication between lawyers and its clients, the US literature on the 
operation of social norms in the field of corporate law has argued that corporate 
law affects directors by changing their belief-systems, as well as by clarifying and 
by reinforcing social norms governing their behaviour120; it has also stressed the 
role  of  lawyers  in  communicating  corporate  law  and  standards  of  conduct  to 
directors121. Whereas this may suggest that lawyers’ message about s. 172(1) may 
be the first ‘input’ in affecting directors’ perceptions about this new provision (so 
that a strategic managerial perspective would not be internalised by directors to 
the extent that it were not transmitted to them by their lawyers), the opposite case 
may  also  occur  because  directors  ultimately  have  the  primary  interest  in 
internalising this perspective122.  Various factors may determine the start of the 
process  from  directors,  i.e.  their  internalisation  of  the  strategic  managerial 
perspective,  and make it  possible the transmission of this  input to lawyers:  as 
argued in the previous part,  directors’ attention to the messages that are being 
publicly issued about s. 172(1), their own competence and their experience and 
skills  in  getting  the  most  out  of  the  dialogue  with  various  categories  of 
professionals can be the decisive factors123. Another element that may play a role 
in allowing a director, who has not been paying attention or proper attention, in 
his decisions, to the factors listed in s.  172(1), to change his approach, and to 
internalise the strategic management perspective, can be the increasing awareness 
that  the  leading  businesses  have  already  regarded  the  statutory  factors  as 
deserving necessary consideration for achieving a sustainable success124. In fact, 
this  awareness  can  induce  this  director  to  assume  these  businesses  –   more 
successful than the one he runs - as models, in order to consolidate his role and to 
increase the general perception of his contribution to the company.   
    Whatever  the  factors  that  can  lead  directors  to  ‘internalise’  the  strategic 
management perspective as the  ‘consultancy’ to be drawn from s. 172(1), when 
this occurs there would be benefits: for the directors themselves,  who would be in 
a position to make their choices undisputable even on an objective basis, and thus 
be in a substantially greater position of control of companies than they would 
otherwise be; for their corporate lawyers, who could find an opportunity to further 
enhance their role as ‘business partners’ by means of a more extensive dialogue, 
in the mutual interest, with other categories of professionals in assisting the long-
term  development  of  the  businesses  which  are  or  may  become  common 
customers; for the courts, who could find, from any cases of directors successfully 
rejecting actions against them by using the strategic management perspective, the 
119 It has, in fact, been suggested that UK lawyers may not wish to be involved in business advice, 
or at least not to the same extent as US lawyers: John Flood, ‘Megalawyering in the Global Legal 
Order’  (1996)  3  International  Journal  of  the Legal  Profession 169,  192;  E.  Norman Veasey, 
Christine  T.  Di  Guglielmo,  ‘The  Tensions,  Stresses  and  Professional  Responsibilities  of  the 
Lawyer for the Corporation’  (2006) 62  Business Lawyer  1, 25-27; Mary C. Daly, ‘The Cultural, 
Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General 
Counsel’ (1997) 46 Emory Law Journal 1057, 1062 and 1077  
120 Melvin Eisenberg, ‘Corporate Law and Social Norms’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review  1253, 
1255,  1269-71  and  1276,  where  ‘social  norms’  are  intended  by  the  Author  as  all  rules  and 
regularities  covering  human  conduct,  other  than  legal  rules  and  organizational  rules,  i.e.  as 
standards of conduct.
121 Edward B. Rock, ‘Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?’  (1997) 44 
University of California at Los Angeles Law Review  1009,  1017-18.  
122 Retro, part II B. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Darling above n 15.
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kind of objective considerations to be used to assess directors’  conduct  in the 
cases where this perspective is not adopted;  for the shareholders, who would get a 
priori  an  ‘insurance’  that  the  optimal  conditions  for  continuing  dividends  are 
being  sought  and  maintained.  The  fact  that  the  co-operative,  long  –  term 
relationships  ‘recommended’  by  the  strategic  management  perspective  would 
offer what can be considered such an ‘insurance’ seems to be confirmed by two 
major reports issued over the years preceding the company law reform, which 
reports attributed the poor performance of many UK companies relative to their 
overseas competitors not only to underinvestment in physical capital and research 
and  development,  but  also  to  a  failure  to  cultivate  long-term,  co-operative 
relationships  with  employees  and,  in  general,  co-operative  relationships  in  the 
‘supply chain’125.  
    Lastly, a consequence deriving from the potential of the strategic management 
perspective to offer an input to legal reasoning would be that, when this input is 
actually offered, the model of companies underpinning UK company law could 
also gradually complete what was regarded as a shift from a contractual model 
into a constituency model126. Notably,  the contractual model regards a company 
as primarily the property of and co-extensive with the founders, and results in the 
interests  of  shareholders  being  equated  with  the  interest  of  the  company;  the 
constituency model in a first variant considers the company run in the interest of 
shareholders when the interests of other groups are also taken into account (on the 
ground  that  to  ignore  them  would  damage  shareholders’  interests),  and,  in  a 
second variant, it  accepts that the concerns of other groups must be taken into 
consideration  because  such  an  approach benefits  the  company  directly127.  The 
gradual  shift  towards  a  constituency  model  or  at  least  towards  a 
contractual/constituency model - i.e. to a model that would be a contractual one, 
acknowledging only the interests of the founders, as regards the foundation stage, 
but would be a constituency one, accepting the concerns of other constituencies, 
when the company is operational - appears to be potentially possible because the 
strategic managerial perspective would offer a reply exactly to what was regarded 
as the difficulty with the constituency model. The difficulty was identified on how 
to  balance  the  competing  interests,  an  issue  which  has  attracted  significant 
criticism128. The reply would be that this can be done by those actions that would 
transmit to each groups the awareness of mutual wealth-creation over time and, in 
so doing, that would best ensure the continuity of the business activity over time 
by fostering co–operative and lasting relationships.  As a result of this,  the task to 
be accomplished could not even be seen any longer as a balancing of interests. 
This  because  –  according  to  the  general  criteria  suggested  by  the  strategic 
managerial perspective to identify the case when the interests of shareholders and 
of other groups coincide129 -  any interests of the groups who would not oppose the 
survival and development of the business activity could no longer be properly 
considered as contrasting with each others.          
   
125 Parkinson, above n. 5,  46.  
126 Janet Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups (2000), 33-36
127 Janet Dine, ‘Model of companies and the regulation of groups’, in Barry A.K.Rider (ed), The 
corporate dimension: an exploration of developing areas of company law (1998), 287. 
128 Inter alia: Mathias M. Siems, ‘Shareholders, Stakeholders and the “Ordoliberalism”’ (2002) 13 
European Business Law Review 147; Elaine Sternberg, Corporate Governance, Accountability in  
the Marketplace (2nd ed.,  2004) 135.
129 Retro, part I, C.  
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IV. A PROPOSED DEFINITION FOR THE INTERNALISATION OF THE 
STRATEGIC MANAGERIAL PERSPECTIVE:  AN   ‘ENLIGHTENED 
DIRECTORS’ PRIMACY’
  In light of all previous arguments, it may be inferred that if/ when directors in the 
UK consider s. 172(1) not as a complication in their decision making and a box 
ticking  exercise,  but  as  a  strategic  advise  on  how  to  make  their  choices 
undisputable  and  catch  this  opportunity  by  taking  the  strategic  management 
perspective, the enlightened shareholder value may lead to an outcome perhaps 
beyond the expectations of the CLRSG.  Although the enlightened shareholder 
value was conceived in such a hierarchical way that the duty to foster the success 
of the company for the benefit of the members takes priority over the duty to take 
into account other interests130, it might result in some companies whose directors 
may identify the elements listed in s. 172(1)  as ‘ingredients’ always necessary for 
business competitiveness and growth, thus for company’s long-term success, in 
order  to  be  able  to  always  justify  their  choice  with  complete  and  consistent 
arguments and thus to insulate themselves from legal actions or in any case to 
prevent ex ante these actions from being successful. As these directors may find, 
for their own interest, that the strategic management perspective turns out being 
the most convenient one, the result of the enlightened shareholders value  in the 
companies run by these directors may be something that the CLRSG perhaps did 
not envisage. This possible result may be explaining by ‘borrowing’ a conceptual 
framework developed in the USA: the ‘directors’ primacy approach’131 . In this 
framework,  which expressly aims at  providing responses  to  the two questions 
concerning  who  controls  corporations  (‘means  of  corporate  governance’)  and 
whose interests should prevail when decision-making is presented with a zero-
sum game (‘ends of corporate governance’), the firm has a nexus of contracts with 
agents which are hired by a central decision-making body, the board of directors. 
The proponents of the framework explain that, unlike what is conceptualised in 
the shareholder primacy approach, the board of directors would not generally be 
hired  by  shareholders,  but  would  hire  factors  of  productions,  amongst  which 
investors  and  thus  shareholders;  however,  in  order  to  successfully  hire 
shareholders,  the  boards  of  directors  need  to  commit  themselves  to  maximise 
shareholders  wealth,  as  shareholders  would  be  the  most  vulnerable  corporate 
constituency and the interests of other stakeholders would be protected either by 
contract or by the law. Thus, this framework submits that the ‘means of corporate 
governance’  is  the  control  of  corporation  by  directors,  and  that  the  ‘ends  of 
corporate governance’ is the maximisation of shareholders wealth.  If applying the 
conceptual  distinction  between ‘means  of  corporate  governance’  and  ‘ends  of 
corporate  governance’  to  those  UK companies  where  directors,  for  their  own 
benefit, may identify the internalisation of the wider concerns listed in s. 172(1) as 
always necessary for business success (for shareholders’ own benefit) and thus 
adopt the strategic managerial perspective,  an observation can be made. It may be 
said that, in those companies, the ‘means of corporate governance’ would be the 
control by directors, but the ‘end of corporate governance’ would be ‘enlightened’ 
because it would  always lie in the maximisation of the possibilities of business 
survival  and development  over  time,  as  a  result  of  which the interest  of  both 
shareholders and other constituencies in getting continuous returns could all be 
130 Arsalidou above n 2, 69; Keay above n 61, 350 
131 Stephen  M.  Bainbridge  ‘Director  primacy:  the  Means  and  Ends of  Corporate  governance’ 
(2003) 97 Northwestern University Law Review 581.
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satisfied. The consequent choices would be oriented by means of two ultimate, 
objective yardsticks: a) the maintaining, over time, of the contribution of each of 
these  constituencies  to  the  business’  survival  and  development,  and  thus  the 
continuity of the business activity; b)  the need to minimise or avoid the risk that 
directorial decisions be seen as creating a zero-sum game between shareholders 
and other stakeholders group, which need could be met by building long-term 
relationships based on trust, and by transmitting to each constituency the message 
that these are the most solid foundation for ensuring, ex ante, the continuation of 
the business activity to the benefit of everybody. Taking into account that a US 
literature defined, in terms of ‘enlightened stakeholders theory’, a stakeholders 
model  where  the  consideration  of  the  interests  of  various  constituencies  is 
oriented by an objective yardstick such as the maximisation of long-term firm’s 
market value132,  what may happen in those UK companies under consideration 
here may well be indicated in terms of ‘enlightened directors’ primacy’133. In other 
words,  the ultimate outcome may be,   in some companies,  that  of introducing 
exactly the approach that would fit in with also with the enlightened stakeholders 
theory,  despite  the  fact  that  the  CLRSG  rejected  the  stakeholder  model  and 
embraced a shareholders centred paradigm. The result may seem paradoxical in 
light of this choice by the CLRSG,  because the ‘enlightened directors primacy’ 
resulting in the companies under consideration would ultimately cause the classic 
distinction  between  shareholders  primacy  and  stakeholders  models  to  become 
purposeless for those companies.  This would be so due to the fact that – as noted 
above -  the  broader  concerns  indicated  in  s.  172(1)  would,  in  the  companies 
considered, always be seen as necessary to achieve the success of the company for 
the benefits of its members as a whole, as the continuity of the enterprise over 
time and its development would be seen as the key component of this success. In 
turn, this would bring the corporate governance approach of these UK companies 
to  coincide,  in  essence,  with  the  approach  which  has  been  accepted  in  some 
continental Europe jurisdictions which accept, expressly or implicitly, the pluralist 
approach: e.g., in the Netherlands, the Corporate Governance Code is based on the 
conception of the company as a ‘long-term form of collaboration between the 
various  parts  involved’  and  identifies  the  general,  ultimate  task  of  the 
management in ensuring the continuity of the enterprise134; in both Germany and 
Austria,  the Corporate Governance Codes accept, in different words,  the same 
conception when they state that the management board undertakes ‘to increase the 
sustainable  value  of  the  enterprise’135 or  set  the  aim of  creating  a  system of 
management and control that is ‘geared to creating sustainable, long-term value’136 
; in  France, the ‘Vienot I’ Code, which identifies the task of the board of directors 
in the promotion of the interest of the company,  states even more expressly that 
the  interest  of  the  company  lies  ‘in  the  overriding  claim  of  the  company 
considered as a separate economic agent, pursuing its own objectives which are 
distinct from those of shareholders,  employees,  creditors including the internal 
132 Michael C. Jensen,  ‘Value Maximisation, Stakeholders Theory and the Corporate Objective 
Function’  (2001) 7  European Financial Management  297, 309 
133                  Alan Dignam, ‘Lamenting reform ? The changing nature of common law corporate governance 
                  Regulation’ (2007) 5 Company and Security Law Journal 283,  293, in commenting s. 172(1), refers to   
                  “enlightened” directors  considering the interests of stakeholders in their decision-making.
134 See ‘The Dutch Code of Corporate Governance. Principles of good corporate governance and 
best practice provisions’, 9 December 2003, Preamble, point 3, emphasis added.
135 See the German Corporate Governance Code (Cromme Code), 2002,  6, emphasis added.    
136 See the Austrian Code of Corporate Governance, 2006 version,  9
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revenue  authorities,  suppliers  and  customers.  It  nonetheless  represents  the 
common interest of  all  these  persons,  which is  for  the company to  remain in  
business and to prosper’137 .  It is evident that the concern for the maintaining over 
time of the resources that the various constituencies offer to the business activity, 
that would characterise the ‘enlightened directors’ primacy’, would also reflect 
the same objective recognised in these continental Europe jurisdictions.     
     Lastly, the ‘enlightened directors’ primacy’ would also imply that, for the 
companies concerned, the ‘enlightened shareholders value’ would fully satisfy the 
recommendations  formulated  in  the  OECD  Principles  with  regard  to  the 
relationships between the different constituencies. The OECD Principles state, in 
fact, that the corporate governance framework should, inter alia,  ‘…encourage 
active  co-operation  between  corporations  and  stakeholders  in  creating  wealth, 
jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises’ 138, and thus recognise 
‘..that the interests of the corporation are served by recognising the interests of 
stakeholders and their contribution to the long-term success of the corporation’139. 
Therefore,  in accordance with the Principles, while acting ‘on a fully informed 
basis, with due diligence and care, and in the best interest of the company and the 
shareholders’, the board should ‘take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other 
stakeholders’  interests  including  those  of  employees,  creditors,  customers, 
suppliers  and local  communities’  and observe (high)  environmental  and social 
standards140.   In  turn,  the  assessment  as  to  whether  these  principles  are  being 
observed should, in addition to applying strictly legal criteria, verify whether there 
is an environment favourable to the respect of mutual agreements141  and whether 
there is widespread disclosure about how stakeholders issue are being handled142. 
It  can  be  easily  realised  that  the  internalisation  of  the  strategic  managerial 
perspective to s. 172(1) 143  (and, thus, the perception of the factors listed there as 
elements that always need to be safeguarded, in the decision-making, by means of 
long term relationships based on trust and of an inclusive and fully transparent 
communication approach)   presupposes, on its own, the conduct recommended 
by the OECD Principles (unlike a ‘lip service’ to these factors or a ‘box-ticking’ 
exercise ).  
CONCLUSIVE REMARK
In conclusion, it may be said that the strategic managerial perspective described in 
part.  I,  which  gives  a  specific  content  to  a  notion  of  ‘success’  as  ‘long-term 
increase in value’, allows directors who accept this perspective to regard s. 172(1) 
as  a  ‘strategic  advise’  to  them  on  how  to  make  their  choices  even  more 
undisputable  than they would otherwise  be.  The company law review process 
which led to  the  reform had the intention to  achieve a  behavioural  change in 
directorial decisions after the short-term perceptions that appeared to prevail in 
recent years144.  This article has ultimately argued that, when directors perceive 
137 See ‘Le conseil d’administration des sociétés cotees’, Rapport du group du travail Association 
Française des Entreprises Privées Conseil National du Patronat Français (Vienot 1 Code), 1995, 8, 
emphasis added.
138 OECD Principles, Charter IV, 21.  
139 OECD Principles, Annotations,  46.
140 OECD Principles, Charter VI, p. 24 Annotations, 58-60.
141 Methodology  for  assessing  the  implementation  of  the  OECD  Principles  on  corporate 
governance (Paris: OECD 2006), p. 45 (hereinafter: Methodology).
142 Methodology, 69
143 Retro, part I 
144 Retro, par. I, A.
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the  benefit  they  could  get  from  ‘internalising’  the  strategic  managerial 
perspective,  and  adopt  the  inclusive  and  fully  transparent  decision-making 
approach resulting from it, two decisive consequences can be expected. First, the 
behavioural change in directors’ decisions that the CLRSG hoped to achieve can 
find  the  best  conditions  to  take  place.  Secondly,  the  strategic  managerial 
perspective could actually offer an input to the legal reasoning and thus to the 
model of companies underpinning UK company law. Its ultimate result for the 
companies  concerned,  that  this  article  proposes  to  define  as   ‘enlightened 
directors’  primacy’,  would be  fully  in  line with  the internationally  recognised 
standards  of  behaviour  for  a  successful  company  (which  standards  may  be 
inferred from the OECD Principles). Ultimately, it may thus be concluded that the 
drafters of s. 172(1) introduced a provision where law and strategic management 
meet  each  other,  which  provision,  as  a  result,  would  have  been  applicable  to 
whatever business–friendly jurisdiction.      
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